Investigating Spokane County Voting Machine Logic & Accuracy Testing

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Bottom Line Up Front: The Spokane County L&A testing conducted on 7/7/2026 employed non-repeatable methodology, an unqualified certifier, undocumented hardware modifications, no individual ballot verification, no statistical accuracy score, and produced testimony from the Auditor herself directly contradicting the claimed 0% error rate — rendering the test scientifically invalid as a measure of voting machine accuracy.

There are 10 major findings:

1. The Wireless Router Contradiction
2. The Repeatability Failure
3. The Printer Failure During The Test
4. The Confusion Matrix Exchange
5. The Thermal Failure Admission
6. The SOS Certifier's Qualifications
7. No Ballot Spot Checking
8. The Cell Phone Observation
9. Only 66 Ballots Actually Created
10. The discrepancy between the sample size and the certification amount.

The following is a report of the 7/7/2026 Spokane County Logic and Accuracy (L&A) Testing conducted at the Spokane County Elections Office located at 1033 W Gardner Ave, Spokane, WA.

I arrived at 9:50 and checked in as an observer for the L&A test. There was total of nine people in attendance for the test: Myself - Michael Segaline (observer), Kim Slinger (observer), Stew Slinger (observer), man-unknown (observer), Callie Gee (observer / democrat candidate for Spokane County Auditor), Vicky Dalton (Spokane County Auditor), Victoria Donahue (Sec. of State Certifier), Amelia Ader (County Election Worker), and Ryan Dousche (County Election Worker).

Vickie Dalton introduced herself and told us a very vague and quick overview of what will happen. Prior to walking onto the ballot processing work floor, where we were told that we cannot have any color pen other than ‘red’ or ‘green’. There was a black sign on the left side of the doorway that stated “No Cell Phones”. We had to sign in on the clipboard to the left of the door prior to entering.

The worker scanned a keycard, the door unlocked, and we were led through the work floor; To our left, a few workers were processing ballots to be mailed out with the continuous noise of the machines. We were led around the mailing machines to a back room in the far left corner of the building. There were two unmarked double doors with only one lock and key. Further up the door was a yellow plastic zip-tie-like seal, which was broken but the county worker in front of us. Prior to entering the room, the group signed in with a clipboard located to the right of the door.

We entered the room where there were ((4)) ClearBallot scanners and ((6)) processing stations, which consisted of a PC and LED monitor. The walls were painted white with ethernet cables tightly organized and running along the walls. There was a threshold that consisted of a long table with a monitor at the far left end. We observers were not allowed past the threshold; At the same time Vicky Dalton, the SOS Certifier, and two election workers moved freely to conduct the test.

Then Dalton, the auditor, began to preach to us about how safe and secure the systems are: “Nothing is on the internet. We even take the time to put all the wires on the walls to prove it… We are about to begin our test, this is the same testing method that has been used for decades. We have a 0% error rate; I will not tolerate any errors.”

I asked Dalton, “What do you think the outcome of this test will be?”

Dalton - “All the ballots will be correctly counted without error. We have a 0% error rate and we won't tolerate anything more.”

Me - “Do you understand that having a 0% *Error Rate* is not a good thing? That means the machine is *overfit* and can't generalize well on unseen data.”

Dalton - “Victoria from the Secretary of State will now explain more”.

Victoria was the only person present with a surgical mask on her face, which she wore the entire time. Victoria explained that we will test the machines with ((253)) ballots. The ballots contained different categories such as: hand marked, machine marked, overvotes, undervotes, coffee-stained, highlighter marked, ripped ballots, folded ballots, damaged ballots, and ect.. We will run them through the scanner and get the counts then we will compare the numbers to our matrix”.

I asked Victoria, “What is your name?”

Victoria - “Victoria.”

Me - “What is your last name?”

Victoria - “Donahue.”

Me - “What is your highest level of education?”

Victoria - “A bachelor's degree.”

Me - “A bachelor's degree in what?”

Victoria - “Political Science.”

Me - “Great, for the record, you are not a statistician. What does ‘model fitness’ mean to you?”

Victoria - “I will have to defer that question to Vicky Dalton.”

Dalton - “I don’t see how that question is relevant, let's move on with the testing.”

Another observer Kim Slinger asked Dalton, “How often do you have problems when the scanners don’t work well?”

Dalton - “We do every once in a while, like when it heats up and we are slammed with ballots; Like last year it got so bad and we had to stop.”

Kim - “How often does this happen?”

Dalton - “I couldn’t give you a number or guess.”

Kim - “How many times a year?”

Dalton - “I don’t know, I couldn’t guess.”

The testing began and the workers showed us observers the zeroed out database, with ‘0’s outputted for all pages of race types as Dalton chimed in, “We zero out the database after every election.”

“((253)) sample ballots are being tested”, Dalton repeated.

Then the ballots were loaded into the scanners and processed. Not one time did we see or have any worker show us the ballot examples being used. We could not verify if the ballots were in fact: ‘torn’, ‘coffee stained’, ‘highlighter marked’, ect. I had observed the data gathering portion of the L&A testing 5 days prior on 7/2/2026 where I observed the two stated election workers create only 66 printed ballots, each ballot representing merely one instance of a category type; These category types are all generated from the machines that would be at an electronic voting booth.

I showed Dalton an image of the *Confusion Matrix*, a very common standard multi-industry matrix to test for classification accuracy of machinery [1][3], asking, “Is this the matrix you use to get the *Accuracy Score*?”

Dalton - “I don’t know, you will have to ask Victoria.”

I asked Dalton, “Are those Fujitsu scanners?”

Dalton, “Yes, they are.”

Me - “What is the scanner’s published read accuracy?”

Dalton - “I don’t know.”

Me - “Has the scanner been independently measured?”

Dalton - “I don’t know.”

Me - “Are you aware that each of those ballot scanners has a wireless router in them?”

Dalton - “No they don’t!”

Me - “According to the *Secretary of State* and the manufacturer *Clear Ballot,* they do”.

Dalton - “No they don’t. We had ours ordered without them, like when you order a car from a manufacturer.”

Me - “Okay so the manufacturer just magically changed all their source-code just so one county can be special.. Prove it.”

Dalton - “Someone removed them.”

Me - “Prove it.”

Dalton - “I will have to refer your question to the Secretary of State.”

After the ballots were scanned, our monitor populated with the counts per precinct and race. One worker read off the results of over 9 pages, as if we were to somehow remember them.

Then the workers tried to print off the ballots with a printer in the room but they were having issues.

Dalton - “We are having a problem with the printer in this room so we will have to print the results off elsewhere. Who wants to follow them to observe the printing?”

I volunteered and followed the worker Ryan and SOS Certifier Victoria Donahue out to the front office of the building, where Ryan plugged in a thumb drive containing the scan results, into his computer to print them out. Ryan handed the printed out test results to Victoria. I showed Victoria a picture of the *Confusion Matrix* and asked, “Is this the matrix you use for scoring.”

Victoria - “No, that's a statistical matrix; This is the matrix we are using for scoring,” as she shows me the stapled spreadsheets of expected counts.

Victoria stood and quickly looked over every page of results (less than 2 minutes) nodded to Ryan and the three of us walked back to the scanner room to join the other observers. The test ballots were put into a large shoebox style of cardboard box and sealed with a yellow plastic zip tie through two punched holes in the top side of the box; The same seal ties used on the door.

Not a single individual ballot was spot checked for accuracy prior to being put into the box. Nor had the workers made any announcement that the numbers were correct, nor did they give an accuracy score.

Dalton - “We seal all of our ballot boxes for security.”

Me - “Vicky, what do you think the results of the test would be if you ran the box of ballots 10 more times?”

Dalton - “They would all be the same with zero error.”

Me - “Vicky, if you were to ship that box of ballots to King County, where they use the *Clear Ballot* machines as well, what do you think the results of the test would be?”

Dalton stood confused as the worker Amelia answered for her: “It wouldn’t work, there would be an error because they (King County) don’t have the same precincts.”

Me - “So this test is not repeatable.”

At that point another observer had visibly pulled out their cell phone in front of Dalton and was asking questions while reading from the phone screen. If that observer had the skills, they could have hacked the ballot scanners via the wireless routers. Dalton made no mention of the cell phone.

The whole experience felt like a North Korean propaganda video, where the state works hard to create an illusion of security and safety but the veneer is peeling off.

Dalton - “Now we will be doing the certification signing, please sign your names on this paper to state that you are witnesses; This doesn’t mean you agree with the findings. Who would like a copy of the certification?”

Most observers signed and most received a printed copy of the certification.

After being handed the certification paperwork, the group of us exited the room; Signing out at 11:05 AM and made our way out past the floor workers to the initial staging area through the secure double doors. There, Dalton was telling us how “the accuracy can be verified when the county has to do a hand-count recount” and how we can check the accuracy with that data; Still she gave no accuracy percentage.

Upon later inspection of the certification paperwork, the “Total Ballots Cast: 234” not ((253)); A discrepancy of ((19)) ballots. The sample size of ((253)) ballots was twice announced by two separate people, twice recorded. Meaning that 234 / 253 = 0.92 or 92% pass rate or certification rate and 8% fail rate; Below a 95% confidence interval.

Observations:

Dalton’s testimony that the machines have quality control issues during heavy operation proves that the *Error Rate* is not ‘0’. The number of twice stated test ballots: ((253)), fails to match the output of ((234)) certified. Meaning at 92% certification rate and a 8% rejection rate; Yielding no real *Error Rate* as Dalton asserts. Additionally Dalton’s claim of 0% *Error Rate* implies that the *Law of Odds* [6], *Law of Thermal Dynamics* [8], software bugs [4][13], and several other factors do not impact the integrity of the machines. Annually, *Clear Ballot* publishes a list of software bugs they have identified and fixed; Several of these bugs + updates had a negative prior effect on the scanner accuracy [4]. Furthermore, an Error Rate of ‘0’ also implies that the classification model is overfit and cannot generalize well on outlier / edge case ballot instances [11][12]. Importantly, a 92% certification rate does not mean the accuracy of each ballot is correct, that means that the machine rejected 19 ballots for whatever reason.

The Spokane County Auditor and County Elections Office refuses / fails to show that the standard TRENDnet TEW-733GR wireless router is not in the county’s *Clear Ballot* machines [4][15]. When questioned about the wireless routers, Dalton went from flat denial to admission that something was removed — which actually confirms the routers existed and required active intervention to remove. That is not the same as saying they were never there.

Additionally, we observed no ballots being used in the test and no ballots were spot-checked for accuracy. We were only told the number ((253)). Moreover, the “Certifier” from the Secretary of State was woefully unqualified to observe statistical accuracy testing. Her education combined with the response to "what does model fitness mean to you" was to defer — confirming she has no framework for evaluating the statistical validity of what she is certifying. Donahue and Dalton claimed ((253)) ballots were tested. I witnessed ((66)) being created. Where did the additional ((187)) ballots come from? This discrepancy needs to be documented and questioned.

Both officials independently cited the same incorrect number — which suggests they were briefed together from the same source that contained the wrong number. This is not a rounding error or a misremembering. It is a specific number ((253)) stated twice by two different officials representing two different government entities during an official proceeding.

The *Logic Test* was not for the machines, but for the “observer”: *Is the observer logical enough to understand that this accuracy test is not logical or scientifically sound?*

Importantly, the test lacks ‘repeatability’ which is a pillar of the scientific method [16]. There was no statistical justification as to why the L&A test was conducted other than Dalton’s comment of,

“We have been doing this testing for decades”. The testers failed to announce a hypothesis before the test [10]; They failed to show a data dictionary or a written testing procedure [10]; They failed to cite any limitations of the test or encourage repeatability[16].

At the same time, the printer failed during a controlled accuracy test. This is significant because:

1) It demonstrates real world equipment failure during testing [4][6][16].

2) The results had to be transferred via thumb drive to a different computer to print.

3) This introduced an uncontrolled data transfer step outside the sealed room.

If the printer issue hadn’t happened the entire verification consisted of:

1) A worker reads nine pages of numbers aloud.

2) SOS Certifier looks at results for less than two minutes and nods.

3) Ballots go into a sealed box. No individual ballot verification, no accuracy score stated, no confidence interval, and no formal pass / fail announcement with documented threshold [10][16].

The Secretary of State Certifier explicitly stated she was not using a statistical *Confusion Matrix* but rather a simple expected-versus-actual count comparison[1][3][5]. This distinction is critical. Standard classification accuracy evaluation requires a *Confusion Matrix* capturing True Positives, True Negatives, False Positives, and False Negatives [5][3]. Simple aggregate count matching cannot detect systematic misclassification — a condition formally documented at the federal level where votes switched between candidates produce identical aggregate totals that pass count-based verification while individual votes are miscounted [7]. This exact failure mode — where optical scan machines search the wrong ballot region causing votes for Candidate A to be attributed to Candidate B — has been formally recognized as a distinct technical problem in 2025 US Patent [13]. The Spokane County L&A testing methodology, relying exclusively on aggregate count matching, is demonstrably insufficient to detect this class of systematic misclassification error.

Repeatability is a foundational pillar of the scientific method [16]. A test that produces different results when run in a different location using the same inputs is not a valid scientific test — it is a location-specific ritual. The L&A test as conducted in Spokane County on 7/7/2026 was demonstrated to be non-repeatable. Results are dependent on precinct configuration specific to Spokane County meaning the test cannot be independently replicated by a third party — a fundamental requirement of scientific validation methodology.

In final analysis:

We reject the null hypothesis that the Spokane County Clear Ballot machines have a 0% error rate, in favor of the alternative hypothesis. There is statistically significant evidence, based on the stated batch of ballots tested vs. ballots certified, and the testimony of mechanical issues by the county auditor. — Importantly we reject the validity of Spokane County's testing methodology as sufficient to establish the claim of 0% *Error Rate* or establishment of an *Accuracy Rate*. The Spokane County Auditor's test as conducted lacks the statistical power, repeatability, independence, and methodological rigor to support any conclusion about true machine accuracy.

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